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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Volume ViII SPRING-SUMMER 1959 Number 2
ILLINOIS SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTING
JURORS IN CIVIL CASES
PHILIP H. CORBOY
"The defense rests, your Honor."
"We have no rebuttal for the plaintiff, Judge."
"Alright, ladies and gentlemen, there will be a short recess while the court
and counsel discuss some matters of importance before final arguments are
heard."
A PROBLEM
OLLOQUY OF this nature most often precedes a hiatus of one, two,
three or even four hours in a civil lawsuit as it exists in today's
system of trial by jury. The "matters of importance" to be dis-
cussed by judge and lawyers is judicial jargon for the trial judge's
examining, digesting, culling out, rejecting and sometimes revising the
endeavors of partisan counsel to state the law as strongly as possible in
behalf of their respective clients. It is the court's way of informing the
jury that he is cognizant of Section 67 of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act' which requires that the "court shall hold a conference with coun-
sel to settle the instructions" that are to be given to the jury at the
close of the case.
Negligence and statutory causes of action are the bases for most of
the litigation submitted to juries in the Illinois Circuit and Superior
Courts. Experienced judges and lawyers, although quite familiar with
the law in these cases, have no easy time in preparing proper charges
to the jury. Complexities of the Scaffolding Act,2 third party prac-
I Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 110, § 67(3).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 48, § 60.
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tice,3 damages under the new Dram Shop Act, 4 presumptions of
pecuniary losses in wrongful death actions ' are some of the newer
problems which have become the subject of instructions. In addition
to these, the court is habitually cajoled by counsel to read statements
concerning preponderance of the evidence, due care, elements of
damages, issues of the case and burden of proof.
Theoretically, of course, it is the judge that informs the jury of the
law but because each case entails law unto itself which must be given
to the jury in writing,6 the privilege of counsel to tender instructions7
has become by practice the rule rather than the exception. The provi-
sion that a party may not raise on appeal the court's failure to give an
instruction unless he shall have tendered it8 has in effect placed upon
counsel the burden of properly instructing the jury. As a corollary,
our trial judges in the Circuit and Superior Courts do not often exer-
cise their judicial right of instructing in other than the fashion re-
quested by the parties, and one Appellate Court has gone so far as to
hold that the primary duty of preparing proper instructions rests on
counsel.9
The trial court is confronted with the sometimes insurmountable
task of giving accurate statements of the law as prepared by counsel
whose very efforts have been to state supposedly sterile legal proposi-
tions in language designedly helpful to his client's cause. That juries
are often misguided by the court's uttering of partisan counsel's efforts
to persuade the jury, rather than to instruct the jury, is a natural
progeny of the practice prevailing in the trial courts of the state. The
First District Appellate Court in Randal v. Deka, fully appreciative of
the origin of instructions, outlined rather succinctly the lawyer's
responsibility in preparing instructions:
The warning contained in these decisions has not been heeded by many coun-
sel who still seem to believe that in order to fulfill their duty to their client it is
necessary that they overwhelm the trial court with a plethora of instructions
peremptory in form. It would seem that many counsel have not as yet fully
grasped the fact that the purpose of giving instructions is to enlighten the jury
and not to create confusion.10
This responsibility of the lawyer as officer of the court is submitted
to the severe pressures of his obligations as an advocate of his client',
3 1. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 110, S 25. 6 I11. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 110, S 67(1).
4IM. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 43, S 135. 7 Ibid., at S 67 (3).
5 11. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 70, S 2. 8 Ibid.
9 Scerrino v. Dunlap, 14 111. App.2d 355, 144 N.E.2d 859 (1957).
10 10 111. App.2d 10, 16, 134 N.E.2d 36,40 (1956).
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cause. Cursory examination of the cases and the statistics involving
judicial review of instructions indicates that more often than not the
lawyer has drafted the instruction with the pen of the advocate rather
than the quill of the officer of the court.
For many years plaintiffs' attorneys had been tendering for mastica-
tion by juries lengthy charges informing the twelve laymen of the
"issues of the case" through the guise of an instruction in the language
of the complaint. It was typical until recently to have a lengthy com-
mentary read to the jury which elaborately informed them of the
plaintiff's allegations of negligence, proximate cause and whatever
other legal verbiage may have been placed in the complaint. These
lengthy quotes from the complaint lent the office of the trial judge to
the plaintiff to state his case to the jury. Frequent warnings by the
Appellate Court went unheeded by lawyers representing plaintiffs
until 1953, when the First District Appellate Court reversed a case in
which an almost eight hundred word summary of the complaint had
been given in behalf of the plaintiff. 1 The court held that this type of
instruction was "unduly prolix" and that it emphasized plaintiff's
charges of liability by placing in the court's mouth substantially the
entire allegations of the complaint.
Almost invariably, lawyers representing defendants in tort and
other civil actions request the court to instruct the jury that it should
return a verdict in favor of the defendant if the evidence is evenly
balanced.1" As late as October, 1958, the First District Appellate Court
specifically held that this is an advantage to which a defendant is not
entitled and that there existed no error in the trial court's refusal to so
inform a jury."3
These are but two examples of lawyers' attempts to have instruc-
tions improperly persuade the jury and to usurp the function of oral
argument. The value, of course, of such premature argument is that it
comes from the bench and is afforded an aura of importance and
credibility that the court should never intend to convey. The courts,
however, have not been at all reticent in indirectly criticizing the bar
for the manner and method in which juries have come to be instructed.
Confusingly worded and misleading instructions, 14 the singling out of
11 Signa v. Alluri, 351 Ill. App. 11, 113 N.E.2d 475 (1953).
12 Healy v. New York Central R. Co., 326 111. App. 556,62 N.E.2d 707 (1945).
13 Goertz v. Chicago Northwestern Ry. Co., 19 111. App.2d 261, 153 N.E.2d 486 (1958).
14 Harsh v. Illinois Terminal R. Co., 351 IM. App. 272, 114 N.E.2d 901 (1953).
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particular elements,'" argumentativeness,16 multiplicity of peremptory
instructions,'7 repetitiousness, 8 excessiveness,'" the failure to quote an
entire statute,20 the restriction of sympathy to only one party,21 in-
applicability of the sudden emergency doctrine22 and the assumption
of evidentiary fact23 have all felt the scorn of our appellate tribunals at
one time or other. The pattern was set as long ago as 1877, when a
Supreme Court judge held that an instruction should not be argu-
mentative, equivocal or unintelligible to the jury.24
The effects of improper jury instructions are of more than academic
concern to the legal profession. In addition to the very probable in-
justice in the resultant verdicts in cases which have never traveled
beyond the trial court, those cases which have been appealed have ex-
perienced an astonishingly high ratio of reversals requiring remand-
ment and new trial in the lower courts. This facet of the problem, in a
day when it takes increasingly longer and longer to reach trial, war-
rants examination if for no other reason than to seek some way to
avoid new trials and the concomitant necessity of placing those cases
which have been remanded on the already overburdened trial court
dockets.
A committee of the Judicial Conference headed by Circuit Court
Judge Robert F. Cotton conducted an examination of all opinions of
all Appellate Courts of Illinois from 1930 until 1955. This survey dis-
closed that in no less than 700 cases in that twenty-five year period
jury instructions had been one of the bases upon which the case was
appealed. Of these, 503 were appealed by defendants who sought re-
versals of judgments in favor of plaintiffs; the remaining 197 were
appealed by plaintiffs who claimed the jury had been improperly in-
structed by charges given in behalf of and most probably tendered by
defendants; 266 or 38 per cent of all cases involving instructions were
actually reversed as having included statements of law to the jury
15 Hughes v. Medendrop, 294 Il. App. 424,13 N.E.2d 1015 (1938).
16 Wolczek v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 342 111. 482,174 N.E. 577 (1931).
17 Authority cited note 9, supra.
18 Chism v. Decatur Newspapers, Inc., 340 Ill. App. 42, 91 N.E.2d 114 (1950).
19 Stevenson v. Byrne, 3 111. App.2d 43, 120 N.E.2d 377 (1954).
20 Stegal v. Carlson, 6 M1. App.2d 388, 128 N.E.2d 352 (1955).
21 Keller v. Menconi, 7 II. App.2d 250, 129 N.E.2d 341 (1955).
22 Randal v. Deka, 10 11. App.2d 10, 134 N.E.2d 36 (1956).
23 Authority cited note 13, supra.
24 Moshier v. Kitchell & Arnold, 87 Ill. 18 (1877).
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which were prejudicially erroneous. No statistics were compiled con-
cerning those cases in which the appellate courts criticized given in-
structions but declined to reverse. It is reasonable to assume, however,
that in many of the 62 per cent or 434 cases which were affirmed,
instructions were given which-although not prejudicially erroneous-
were subject to criticism. The doctrines of harmless error 2' and that
of reading the instructions as a whole 26 undoubtedly saved many of
those cases from reversal.
Of the 503 cases appealed by defendants, the appellants were suc-
cessful in reversing 166 or 33 percent of the cases in which it was
contended that plaintiffs had been responsible for the giving of im-
proper instructions. The 197 appeals by plaintiffs resulted in 50.3 per
cent or 99 of tile cases being reversed because of improper instructions
tendered by defendant. Presumably because of the expense involved,
it is a well known fact that plaintiffs suffering a not guilty verdict at
the hands of the trial jury are less inclined to appeal than are defend-
ants who have insurance companies or claim departments capable of
assuming the financial cost of appeal. It would be purely speculative
to hazard any estimate as to what the percentages would be if all cases
tried were appealed and all instructions judicially reviewed. The near
four out of ten reversals which we have for our analysis are sufficient
commentary on the bar's ability to satisfy the courts' standards of
properly informing the jury of the law. If it is accepted that the pur-
pose of instructions is to give the jury information concerning the
law of the case applicable to the facts, then the many opinions casti-
gating lawyers for being remiss in their responsibility and the 38 per
cent reversal of cases involving instructions tend to indicate that there
is something glaringly imperfect in the existing method of instructing
the jury and in the training, ability and attitude of court and counsel.
That deficiencies exist is a fact which both the courts and the organ-
ized bar have been aware for no short time.
AN ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM
The Judicial Conference to which Judge Cotton's committee re-
ported on June 6, 1956, is composed of the judges of the Supreme
Court, the Appellate Court and the Circuit and Superior Courts of
25 Bunton v. Illinois Central R. Co., 15 Iil. App. 2d 311, 146 N.E.2d 205 (1957); Camp-
bell v. Ragel, 7 Ill. App.2d 301, 129 N.E.2d 451 (1955).
26 Thompson v. Weible, 19 III. App.2d 422, 154 N.E.2d 71 (1958); Hulke v. Interna-
tional Mfg. Co., 14 111. App.2d 5, 142 N.E.2d 717 (1957).
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the state. It meets once a year and its function is to consider the busi-
ness and the problems pertaining to the administration of justice in
the state and to make recommendations for its improvement. The
Conference is created pursuant to authority of Supreme Court Rule.2 7
The survey so impressed the Conference that it recommended to
the Supreme Court that the Court appoint a committee to study the
problem of jury instructions. Acting on the resolution adopted by the
Judicial Conference, the Justices of the Supreme Court consulted with
the Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association for
the purpose of appointing a committee to study the problem of jury
instructions. Both of these bar organizations had several years experi-
ence in this endeavor. The Chicago Bar Association had promulgated
a handbook of instructions in 1948,2 s and the Illinois State Bar Asso-
ciation's Section on Civil Practice and Procedure was at the very
moment of the Judicial Conference's recommendation to the Supreme
Court in the process of examining and editing 400 civil instructions.
In the early part of 1957, the Supreme Court appointed a committee
from the bench, the bar and the law schools of the state to study the
jury system and, in particular, the problem of jury instructions. By
the order of appointment, the committee was required to advise the
court from time to time of the committee's recommendations. The
personnel of the committee included three law professors, five judges
and nine lawyers actively engaged in the trial of civil litigation repre-
senting the attitudes of plaintiffs and defendants. On February 16,
1957, this committee commenced its work with a direction from the
Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court "to work upon the project
of possible improvements in our system of jury instructions."
In attacking the problem of jury instructions, the committee found
that the existing problems were not alone peculiar to Illinois. It
developed that states from coast to coast had at one time or another
been confronted with the difficulty of informing twelve laymen of the
law applicable to the facts of the case they were to decide. In most of
the jurisdictions, precious court hours were dissipated in the prepara-
tion of instructions which all too often were subject to upper court
judicial criticism.
It was thought that instructions in simple, concise, easily understood
layman's language which would be available to the bar and to the
27 Supreme Court Rule 56.1 (1956), I11, Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 110, S 101.56.1.
28 Chicago Bar Association (1948),
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courts would go far in combating the two-pronged evil of wasted
time and nonunderstandable statements of the law. Existing compila-
tions, 29 although readily accessible to lawyers and judges, have done
little to preserve time in either the lawyer's office or in the judge's
chambers preparatory to the case going to the jury. Instructions taken
from those collections, used unsparingly by the trial bar, have not been
immune to condemnation in the appellate courts and quite obviously
have done little to reduce the number of reversals in cases involving
instructions. An examination of our sister states' attempts to solve the
conundrum of giving easily understood statements satisfying substan-
tive principles of the law which need not be recreated for each case
seemed to be a logical starting point for the committee.
Problems associated with instructions are not of recent experience
and as long ago as 1938, in the State of California, therie was instituted
a reform which 'esulted in the publication of a Book of Approved
Jury Instructions.a° This manual was the work product of California
lawyers and judges who drafted and published a set of instructions
palatable to practitioners and courts, which nevertheless properly in-
formed laymen of the law. BAJI, as the California publication has
come to be known, contains instructions which are built up in blocks
so that portions can be added or taken away as each party prefers.
Alternative words, phrases and even sentences are included for the
choice of the users and for the purpose of making the instruction
pertinent to the case at bar. Under the system that has developed from
the use of BAJI, the entire group of instructions is placed in the files
of the clerk of the court and each is given a number synonymous with
that in the Book of Approved Jury Instructions. At the inception of
trial, the respective lawyers inform the clerk of the instructions they
wish tendered on behalf of their clients and at the same time opposing
counsel is given the number of the instructions his adversary desires to
give to the jury. Any legal statements which counsel regards as perti-
nent and material to the case not included in the charges, which have
come to be regarded as "pattern" instructions, are tendered along with
those chosen from the approved list. If unanticipated evidence de-
velops during the trial which requires further instructions, the law-
29 Hemphill, Illinois Jury Instructions (1951); Chicago Motor Club, Jury Instruc-
tions, Automobile Cases (5th Ed., 1950); Chicago Bar Association (1948); Klass, Illinois
Automobile Negligence Kit (1937); McCarthy, Illinois Instructions to Juries (1932).
30 California Jury Instructions (also known as Book of Approved Jury Instructions
(3d Ed., 1943).
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yers may again repeat the process of choosing from among the "pat-
tern" instructions or of supplying instructions drafted by themselves.
Stereotyped allegiance to the publication is neither intended nor de-
sired, but it is only the rare case involving a statement of law peculiar
to it that requires counsel to go outside the printed volumes for his
tendered statements of the law. Thus, though "pattern" instructions
are available there is nothing stereotyped or inhibiting in this system.
Inherent in this practice is avoidance of the hectic drafting and re-
drafting of tendered instructions. The most irritating, although per-
haps not the most important, deficiency in our practice is the frantic
search for additional instructions and the debate that inevitably fol-
lows their entrance into the case. In the interim, the jury sits idly by
contemplating, it is presumed, elements completely ulterior to their
fact finding responsibility.
The time saving and labor reducing factors in California, however,
are accompanied by equally fascinating results inviting examination.
The plan of instructing juries from a preordained codification of sub-
stantive and cautionary statements of law has received the approbation
of the California upper courts. In Temple v. DeMirjian, the California
Appellate Court said:
Unquestionably "California Jury Instructions" has saved much labor on the
part of trial judges and it should be added that this work has saved considerable
labor on the part of the justices of the reviewing courts of the state. We have
found that the instructions prepared by the authors, which we have been called
upon to review, contain accurate statements of pertinent principles of law pre-
sented in a manner fair to both sides of the litigation. By their use trial judges
have been able to inform juries fairly and fully concerning the law applicable to
the issues before them. The natural result is that now a smaller number of judg-
ments are reversed because of erroneous instructions than in former times.3 1
Perusal of BAJI, now in its fifth edition, in two volumes, indicates
that the instructions although sometimes quite lengthy are for the
most part straightforward, clear, unequivocal statements of law. This
clarity of prose is undoubtedly responsible for the acceptance of the
instructions by members of the judiciary and of the legal profession,
yet the true value of the California system lies not in its approval by
lawyers and judges but in its effect upon upper court litigation grow-
ing out of allegedly erroneous instructions by the trial court. It is this
aspect of the effectiveness of the California system which is no less
than phenomenal. A recent survey of upper court California decisions
has indicated that reversal occurs in a mere 7.1 per cent of those cases
31 51 Cal. App.2d 559, 566, 125 P.2d 544, 548 (1942).
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in which the appeal revolved upon questions of instructions! This is a
far cry from the 38 per cent that exists in the State of Illinois.
The California system, without benefit of judicial conference sanc-
tion, has with modifications been placed in use in Arizona, Idaho,
Utah, Nevada, Oregon and Washington. Similar methods have been
created in Texas and Indiana. No statistics are available concerning tile
effect upon appeals in those jurisdictions, but practicing lawyers from
those states have granted approbation to the systems that have placed
at their disposal readily available instructions at the time of trial.
The courts of the State of Illinois should not be asked, of course, to
follow blindly systems that have been used in sister states merely be-
cause they have been successful and acceptable in other jurisdictions.
Differences in procedural and substantive law would prohibit indis-
criminate adoption of methods prevailing in other states. Presump-
tions, transfer of the burden of proof, effect of violations of statutory
responsibilities and many other elements of a lawsuit would be suffi-
ciently different to render inadaptable instructions prepared for the
use of lawyers in foreign jurisdictions. It is, however, advantageous to
any group seeking guidance and assistance to investigate, interpret,
analyze and criticize all systems and methods of instructing juries. The
California approved instructions have been elaborately examined by
the committee not because of their anticipated acceptance in Illinois
but simply because they have met with success on appeal and have
been overwhelmingly received by lawyers using the California system.
The Illinois group in its attempt to mitigate the problems has in a
sense "started from scratch" in that the members of the committee
have engaged in a complete basic review of the substantive law of
Illinois. Any civil instructions would have to be drafted within that
framework if they are to possess technical validity. Section 67 of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act is the base from which any system must
have its origin and must guide any improvement that may obtain. It
is very important then to know exactly what entails an instruction
"only as to the law of the case." Case decisions are quite helpful in this
regard. Over sixty years ago, the First District Appellate Court held
in North Chicago Street RR. Co. v. Johnson that "to instruct is to
impart knowledge or information. An instruction as the word is used
in the statute means communication of knowledge; knowledge im-
parted. 31 2 In that case the trial court had given an instruction to the
32 84 11. App. 670, 672 (1903).
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jury followed by oral remarks indicating its withdrawal because he
thought it improper. The statute as it then existed required written
charges to the jury, and the lower court was reversed for giving an
oral instruction. Without benefit of further decisions it would seem
that words of a court indicating a change of mind on an instruction
previously given would be regarded as an instruction and in contra-
vention of the requirement that it be in writing. Contrary decisions
were reached in two later cases '3 in which the courts held that to
withdraw orally from consideration by the jury an instruction in-
advertently given was not prohibited by the Practice Act. The court
said in Devine v. City of Chicago:
What was said by the court in withdrawing the instruction in the case at bar
was nothing the jury were called upon to consider in determining the issues in
the case, and cannot be treated as a qualification, modification or explanation of
a given instruction or a violation of section 74 of the Practice Act.3 4
An oral statement to the jury by the judge to the effect that it
would be improper for the jury to examine the location of an accident
was held not to be an instruction as to the law of the case but was
regarded only as a direction to the jury as to their conduct during
adjournment.35 Other oral statements by the court have been held not
to be "instructions" and it is permissible to direct a jury orally to
disregard the remarks of a witness, 6 to disregard remarks of counsel,3 7
to disregard evidence produced on an item subsequently stricken
from the pleadings,38 to tell the purpose of admitting evidence, " and
to advise the jury on the reasons for certain rulings on evidence.40
In defining instructions according to their function, the Third
District Appellate Court recently stated that:
[T]he object of instructions is to clearly inform the jury in a concise and com-
prehensive manner, what the issues are, the principles of law to be observed and
the facts material to be proved to justify their verdict. 4'
23 Chicago & Eastern Ill. R. Co. v. Zapp, 209 I11. 339, 70 N.E. 623 (1904); Devine v.
Chicago, 178 111. App. 39 (1913).
'14 178 Ill. App. 39, 43 (1913).
:1 Pioneer Construction v. Sunderland, 188 111. 341, 58 N.E. 928 (1900).
36 Hayes v. Wagner, 220111. 256,77 N.E. 211 (1906).
.17 Ohio & Mississippi Ry. Co. v. Wangelin, 152 i1. 138,38 N.E. 760 (1892).
38 Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Norvell, 212 111. A pp. 218 (1918).
.39 People v. Horn, 309 I11.23,140 N.E. 16 (1923).
40 South Park Commissioners v. Ayer, 245 I11. 402, 92 N.E. 294 (1910).
41Warnes v. Champaign County Seed Co., 5 111. App.2d 151, 156, 124 N.E.2d 695,
697 (1955).
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The Illinois Supreme Court has said:
The sole function of instructions is to convey to the minds of the jury the cor-
rect principles of law applicable to the evidence submitted to it in order that,
having determined the final state of facts from the evidence, the jury may, by
the application of proper legal principles, arrive at a correct conclusion accord-
ing to the law and the evidence.
42
"As to the law of the case" in Paragraph 67 of the Civil Practice
Act seems quite explicit and modem day practitioners make no at-
tempt to supply the court with facts or evidence upon which to
comment to the jury during instructions. The courts were not always
so restricted and at common law, the judge instructed orally, summed
up the evidence and commented upon the evidence when he so de-
sired.43 The Illinois Constitution of 181814 provided "that the right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." The right guaranteed was the
common law of England as modified by the courts of the United
States at the time of the adoption of the Illinois Constitution. 45 Al-
though there exists no Supreme Court case approving or disapproving
the practice, if it existed, there was no impediment to the trial court's
commenting on the evidence until 1827, when the General Assembly
passed an act concerning practice in courts of law which provided,
"The Circuit Courts in charging the jury shall only instruct as to the
law of the case."4 This section applied to both civil and criminal trials
and remained a part of our statutory law until 1933, when the Prac-
tice Act was repealed in its entirety.47 This new act included a pro-
vision that the court shall instruct only as to the law of the case and
by its terms applied only to civil trials. Supreme Court Rule 27
adopted December 22, 1933, required that in criminal cases, the court
shall give instructions to the jury in accordance with Section 67 of
the Civil 'Practice Act. The present Illinois Supreme Court Rules also
provide that in criminal cases instructions to the jury shall be tendered,
settled and given in accordance with Section 67 of the Civil Practice
Act.4
In 1934, the Honorable Joseph B. David flaunted Rule 27 in a
42 People v. Gambony, 402 I11. 74, 81, 83 N.E.2d 321, 325 (1949), cert. denied 337 U.S.
970 (1949).
43 Chambers v. People, 105 111.409 (1883). 44 Ill. Const. Art. VIII, § 6 (1818).
45 People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934); People v. Bruner, 343 111. 146,
175 N.E. 400 (1931).
46 I11. Gen. Laws (1827) no. 319. See also 11. Rev. Stat. (1874) p. 781, § 52.
47 I11. Gen. Laws (1933) no. 785.
48 Supreme Court Rule 25 (1956), I11. Rev. Star. (1957) c. 110, § 101.25.
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criminal case and blithely instructed the jury orally. In addition to
instructing the jury contrary to statute and the rules, this well known
jurist reviewed and commented upon the evidence.49 The guilty ver-
dict was appealed by the defendant and the supreme court held that
it had the power to restrict instructions in the trial court and that the
power of the court to comment on the evidence was not an historically
fundamental element of a jury trial guaranteed by the constitution
but merely a detail or a method by which the right was exercised.
Earlier, in People v. Kelly, the court was very explicit when it said:
This court has repeatedly held that it is beyond the province of a trial court
to express his opinion on the weight of the evidence or comment on the facts.
This principle has been enunciated in an unbroken line of decisions of this court
beginning with the case of Bill v. People.50
The effect of these decisions is that a court by statute cannot express
his opinion on the weight of the evidence or comment on the facts.
Although Illinois Statutes for many years have restricted instruc-
tions to contain only the law of the case, there has never been nor is
there now any statutory or constitutional annulment of the court's
common law power to summarize the evidence. Chief Justice Cart-
wright recognized this in 1916, when he wrote:
[Tlhat limitation upon the common law [instructing only as to the law of
the case] did not, however, prevent the judge from stating to the jury the
testimony with its legal effect and bearing upon the issues and indicating its
particular application to the case under the rules of law. The court might still
sum up the evidence according to the established practice.5'
That at least some trial courts have undertaken to sum up the evi-
dence, even though improperly, is evident in the ancient Supreme
Court case of Evans v. George:
In the last instruction of the series, the court undertook to give the jury a
summary of the principal facts, which they were to consider in their deliber-
ations on their verdict. It directed their attention only to facts favorable to
defendants, and left out of view all that tended to illustrate plaintiff's theory of
the case. It is the duty of the jury to consider all the facts, and when the court
assumes to direct their attention to the facts, it should refer them to all the facts,
so as to present the case fairly for both parties. Otherwise, the jury might un-
derstand the facts stated in the instructions are the only ones necessary to be
considered in deliberating on their verdict.512
The practice of summarizing, however, has fallen into disuse not
because of any legal obstacle but because of the difficulty in drawing
4 People v. Callopy, 358 111. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934).
50347 111.221,223,179 N.E. 898, 899 (1932).
51 10 Il. L. Rev. 537, 538 (1916). 52 80 11.51, 54 (1875).
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an instruction summarizing all of the facts. As the supreme court has
stated in Martin v. Johnson, "It is utterly impracticable to embody
all the facts of a case in an instruction. '5 3 The requirement that all
instructions be in writing would entail too lengthy a document. Con-
temporary instructions which attempt to state the theory of the par-
ty's case and which resort to a summarization of the facts have been
held erroneous when all of the facts have not been placed in the
summary.54 Hence, the practical effect of Section 67 of the Illinois
Civil Practice Act requiring the court to instruct only as to the law
and in writing is to prevent the court from expressing an opinion as
to the facts, weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses and to
deter him from summarizing the evidence for the jury.
In arriving at a proper definition of instructions and in conforming
instructions to existing case and statutory law, the Illinois Supreme
Court Committee on Jury Instructions concluded that instructions
with utility are not simply directions to the venire with reference to
their duties or responsibilities, nor are instructions explanations to the
jury of court procedures. Instructions, it was decided, are nothing
more nor less than statements of the applicable law to the evidence
and descriptions of the issues to be decided by the jury under the law
and the evidence.
Having thus determined the framework in which improvement
could be sought, the drafters were next confronted with the job of
fabricating instructions within the confines of the definition. Like
jurors, the members of the committee were required to accept the
existing law as it was-not as they liked it or as they would have pre-
ferred it. It was necessary then that any attempt to improve or create
a system, if it were to be accepted by active practitioners and courts,
would have to be within the periphery of existing substantive law.
Any attempt to change that law in the drafting of instructions could
but lead to rejection of any product and oblivion for any callow sys-
tem that may be suggested. The Illinois Supreme Court Committee
on Jury Instructions has no inherent powers nor any alleged dele-
gated responsibilities to suggest changes in the substantive law. It has
accepted its responsibility in the light of existing statutes and decisions
and has sought to adapt them into a system of instructions that will
obviate or at least reduce criticisms by upper courts.
That an accomplishment of this measure has its obstacles needs no
53 89111.537 (1878).
54 Allied Mills, Inc. v Miller, 9 111. App.2d 87, 132 N.E.2d 425 (1956).
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elaboration. A measure of success, however, can be anticipated in the
manner and approach that this committee has designed for itself. To
the original seventeen-man committee have been added five associate
members, each of whom serves a subcommittee of three members.
The chairman and reporter represent the additional two men initially
appointed by the Supreme Court. Since the organizational meeting on
February 16, 1957, members have met two days each month in the
Board of Governors Room of the American Bar Association on the
University of Chicago campus. The procedure is not unlike the work
pattern of the Chicago Bar Association and Illinois Bar Association
Joint Committee on the Civil Practice Act in that a considerable
amount of work is accomplished between monthly meetings by the
subcommittees.
Prior to each monthly two-day meeting, a steering committee of
three meets with the Chairman, Mr. Gerald C. Snyder, for two hours.
All matters of policy which may have arisen are considered with a
view to making recommendations to the full committee. The agenda
of the meeting is reviewed with specific assignments allocated to the
five subcommittees. As to the instructions themselves, the reporter
prepares original drafts of instructions in areas assigned by the full
committee. These drafts are reviewed by the steering committee be-
fore they are assigned to each of the subcommittees. A critique of
each of these instructions is first manifest at the subcommittee level
wherein the benefit of all of the law on the subject has been available
through briefs, law review articles, case decisions, statutes and ordi-
nances supplied in theory by the associate members but in practice by
all members of the respective subcommittees.
The chairman and the two members of each subcommittee analyze,
examine and reconstruct these instructions usually on Friday after-
noon and evenings and between monthly meetings. Their finished
work product is then delivered to the reporter for re-evaluation by
the full committee at the following month's meeting. Saturdays are
usually spent by the entire committee, reporter and chairman again
reviewing, examining, altering or otherwise treating the instructions
of the various subcommittees. Thus, each instruction which is hoped
to become a part of a system is the work product not of one man nor
of one subcommittee but of twenty-two men who have lived with
each statement of the law for hour upon hour before a tentative draft
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is formulated and given to the reporter for reproduction. This draft
is then supplied to all members of the committee for future reference.
When sufficient tentative drafts accumulate, the full committee meets
on both Friday and Saturday for final pre-publication determination.
Considering that instructions which have long been tendered by
active trial lawyers have met with upper court disapproval not only
of their use but of their content, it may with no little reason be asked
"what is the format of this new method which the bar will be asked
to accept?" "What is different from those which we have used so
long?" "What improvement can we expect?" "What are the gains
that might be enjoyed?"
The answers to these questions have their genesis in the very case
decisions which deplore prevailing methods of instructing juries. Ob-
viously, argumentative, misleading, incomplete, repetitious instruc-
tions have no place in any system worthy of the approval of lawyers.
If improvement is to be obtained and if a recognized system is to be
developed, certain fundamental standards must govern the drafting
of all instructions to be submitted not only to the supreme court but
to the organized trial bar which will use them.
It is well recognized under the present lack of system that the
province of instructing juries has relegated the role of the court to a
mere reading agent. The dignity of the judiciary apparently remains
in chambers as the court is compelled to utter an argument for one
side and then, if opposing counsel has been reasonably adept, to mouth
persuasion for the other. Justice can be better served, the court more
respected, and the instructions more easily heeded and followed if the
judge assumes his rightful leading place in the hierarchy of the court-
room. This can be attained if he transmits the applicable law to the
twelve lay jurors in such a way that he informs them of the law in a
straightforward, studied manner and if he emphasizes the jury's re-
sponsibility in applying the law. The committee's awareness of this
ideal was responsible for the creation of certain standards to govern
the drafting of each instruction. These rules formulated early in the
career of this attempt to bring systematic convenience to the art and
method of informing juries of the law are: (1) the instruction should
be conversational; (2) the instruction should be understandable; (3)
the instruction should be unslanted; and (4) the instruction should be
accurate in its statement of the law.
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CONVERSATIONAL
Many of the instructions in vogue have no preliminary introduction
of any semblance other than "The court instructs the jury" or "The
jury are further instructed" which precede statements of law some
ten or twelve times during the court's charge to the jurors. Stilted,
mechanical repetition of this type cannot but antagonize the most
responsible of veniremen. Despite the attitudes of some persons whose
interests are foreign to the jury system, the law, as we know, assumes
that jurors will do their duty.55 How difficult must be their job and
how diminished must be their respect for court and law when they
are forced to listen to a half hour's rendition in language completely
different from that used in the execution of the ordinary yet impor-
tant affairs of life of the average juror.
Use of the second person, talking in terms of "you do this," em-
ployment of words that the ordinary person uses in ordinary speech
and avoidance of legalisms like "whereas" and "aforesaid" should re-
sult in a favorable reaction on the part of the jury. Though the court
must preserve his authority throughout his disclosure of the law, a
conversational attitude on his part should do much to create a rapport
between court and jury at that juncture of the trial. If that rapport
can be effected by conversing about the law with the jury rather than
stating legalisms in abstract terms to the jury, the conversational in-
struction should be adopted by and remembered by jurors in their
deliberations.
UNDERSTANDABLE
The advent of the automobile has been responsible for the Illinois
Guest Law. 6 A guest in a motor vehicle who has filed a lawsuit based
upon a cause of action arising out of conduct by the driver or operator
of the vehicle resulting in injury to the guest must prove wilful and
wanton misconduct before he can recover. The instruction most often
tendered by plaintiffs is, to say the least, difficult for lawyers to un-
derstand.57 Comprehension by jurors, all of whom should lack legal
training, is a result that even the most optimistic defendants of the
status quo would have difficulty in accepting.
55 Hall v. Chicago Northwestern Ry. Co., 5 111.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
56 111 Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 95 Y2, § 9-201.
57 Chicago Motor Club, Jury Instructions, Automobile Cases (5th Ed., 1950), In-
struction No. 10.2.
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The "burden of proof" instructions that are given in each case 5s
often lack complete understanding in the legal profession and, again,
misapprehension among the laity cannot be totally unexpected. At-
tempts to modify this responsibility have been met with judicial cha-
grin." Yet at the close of the evidence, the court is faced with the
problem of communicating to the jury a yardstick by which they
can determine if that party with the burden has satisfied it. That the
jury should be fully aware of the nature of the burden of proof was
pointed out by Judge Jerome Frank in Larson v. Jo Ann Cab Corp.:
But no matter what the difficulties may be of rendering many of the legal
rules intelligible to the jury, surely the most important part of the judge's charge
relative to the facts-i.e., that of dealing with the burden of proof-ought to be
so worded that jurors can comprehend it.60
Plaintiffs' counsel in actions seeking damages for personal injuries
have faithfully followed an 1878 decision which suggested that it was
the province of the jury to determine the damages that plaintiff should
recover, if any.61 The court held that an instruction which did not
restrict the jury to the evidence was improper. This attachment has
forced juries to hear the prepositional phrase, if any, no less than ten
times interspersed throughout the typical damage instruction. 62 How
lacking in sense must a jury conclude is a statement of law that refers
to "the nature and the extent of the injury, if any" after it has heard
three days of medical testimony concerning the plaintiff's amputated
leg or broken arn. Can a juror be expected to understand the legal
nicety that requires an element in issue not to be assumed? True, the
general phraseology of today's damage requires the "if any" diminu-
tion by the court to be repeated numerous times throughout the body
of the charge. This does not preclude, however, a complete new
approach in which the jury could be told that whether or not any
of the elements of damage exist is not assumed but rather is for the
jury to decide.
These are but a few of the areas in which single instructions may
lack complete understanding by jurors. This evil can be mitigated by
the use of short sentences and short words, by giving the reason be-
hind the rule, and by indicating when a move from one subject to
58 Authority cited note 9, supra. 60 209 F.2d 929,935 (C.A.2d, 1954).
59 Ibid. 61 Martin v. Johnson, 89 111.537 (1878).
62 Krichbaum v., Chicago City Ry. Co., 207 Ill. App. 44 (1917).
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another has been made. Circumlocution should certainly be avoided.
There should 'be no need to say "in the event that" when "if" will do.
There is yet another method by which jurors can be misled. There
are literally hundreds of instructions in common use today which
when standing alone are good, solid, sound, understandable statements
of the law. These are usually referred to as "stock instructions." The
complexion of an understandable statement can be completely changed
by the presence of an equally comprehensible statement with but
slight variations. Twelve laymen must be particularly irked and mis-
led when they are told in one statement that the number of witnesses
is not important 3 and in another that the number of witnesses should
be taken into consideration.64 What credence should they give a
party's testimony when they are initially told that he is entitled to
testify and should be judged by the standards applied to others and
are then informed that his position as a party should be taken into
consideration in determining his credibility?66 What should a jury do
when they are told that an aggravation of a pre-existing injury is
compensable67 but that if they find "the plaintiff has now or has had
any other disability resulting from conditions which existed in the
plaintiff before the accident," he cannot recover?6"
Collating all instructions on a given point of law and compressing
all to which either party is entitled into one recommended instruction
on the subject is the method that has been applied in the committee's
quest for a system of instructions which will avoid misleading the
jury by way of ostensible conflict. The contraction of two or more
instructions, of course, must be accomplished in line with the sentence
structure and use of words previously discussed making the end prod-
uct both conversational and understandable.
UNSLANTED
"But, judge, you just 'okayed' defendant's instruction, how about giving a
plaintiff's instruction on this same point?"
This type of complaint or request often emanates from either side
while the jury awaits final arguments after the promised short recess
63 Deering v. Barzak, 227 111.71,81 N.E. 1 (1907).
64 Walsh v. Chicago Ry. Co., 294 Ill. 586, 128 N.E. 647 (1920).
65 Simon v. Chicago, 279 Il1. App. 80 (1935).
66 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Tuohy, 196111.410,63 N.E. 997 (1902).
67 Behles v. Chicago Transit Authority, 346 Ill. App. 220, 104 N.E.2d 635 (1952).
68 Hays v. Penn. R. Co., 19 111. App.2d 368, 374, 153 N.E.2d 737, 739 (1958).
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while court and counsel discuss "some matters of importance." Exam-
ination of the statute governing the giving of instructions,69 and ex-
tensive investigation of case law discloses no authority for the exist-
ence of "plaintiff's" or "defendant's" instructions. There is no vested
interest in having the court give a statement of law which in any way
makes it apparent that it belongs to one side or the other. It is true
that each party is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case 7°
but it is equally well settled that the court need not give more than
one statement as to the law applicable to the facts and that once he
has given an instruction which adequately covers a subject, he need
not give others covering the same subject. 71 The difficulties of having
the court state the law which may be favorable to one party without
in some measure sounding partisan is recognized. This is much differ-
ent from a partisan argument contained in a tendered instruction upon
the basis that it expresses the party's "theory of the case."
We have seen that it is the province of an instruction to state the
law applicable to the case and further to describe properly the issues
to the jury. It has specifically been held that the trial court is obligated
to define the issues for the jury.72 Trouble has been encountered when
an instruction seeking to spell out the issues, in the guise of language
of the complaint or thinly camouflaged as a "theory of the case" has
degenerated into nothing less than slanted partisan argument. The
decisions are not at all harmonious as to how issues can be sent to the
jury without being slanted in favor of the party authoring the in-
struction. In an earlier era, the jury could take pleadings to the jury
room and then find the issues by referring to the pleadings. 73 When
pleadings were no longer permitted to be reviewed in the sanctity of
the jury's deliberation it was held error to refer the jury to charges
in the complaint in the absence of further instructions pointing out
what was charged.7 4 Thereafter, instructions on the issues were com-
posed of quotes from the pleadings but this, too, suffered a setback
in Signa v. Alluri.75 In that case the court held that the court should
69 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 110, § 67.
7
o Hocker v. O'Klock, 16 111. App.2d 414, 148 N.E.2d 618 (1958); Pittman v. Duggan,
336 il. App. 502, 84 N.E.2d 701 (1949).
71 Williams v. Walsh, 341 111. App. 543, 95 N.E.2d 743 (1950).
72 Authority cited note 13, supra.
73 West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Buckley, 200 11. 260, 65 N.E. 708 (1902); City o:1 East
Dubuque v. Burhyte, 73 111. 553, 50 N.E. 1077 (1898).
74 Krieger v. Aurora E. & C. R. Co., 242 I11. 544,90 N.E. 266 1909).
75 351 I11. App. 11, 113 N.E.2d 475 (1953).
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inform the jury in a clear and concise manner of the issues raised by
the pleadings and that this could be accomplished by a summary of
the pleadings succintly stated without repetition and without undue
emphasis.
An articulate instruction which spells out the charges made in the
complaint and which portrays just as fairly and as lengthily the de-
fenses alleged in the answer (including any affirmative defenses or
counterclaims) will convey to the jury not only the issues but in a
sense the respective theories as created by the issues.
Slanted, argumentative statements containing facts and language
which are consistent with the theory only of the party tendering the
instruction have no part in any proper system of informing a jury. It
is this concept that has prodded the committee in attempting to create
non-partisan, fair, unslanted instructions not only in the fields that
have been mentioned but in all others. To render an instruction un-
biased, yet to satisfy the rights of the litigants in properly stating the
law is by standards of today's instructions no easy task. To include
such instructions in an acceptable system is the goal of those recom-
mending that instructions be unslanted.
ACCURATE
Accuracy in the knowledge of the law is perhaps the least concern
of practicing trial lawyers upon whom devolves the responsibility of
drafting and submitting instructions. Their knowledge of the law
pertaining to the types of cases prevailing on the dockets is quite
extensive. Principles of negligence, due care, proximate cause, dam-
ages, burdens of proof, violations of statutes, to mention a few, are
well known and easily digestible by advocates and courts at the trial
stage of litigation. The real problem seems to exist not in the inability
to state the law accurately but rather when to state that which is ap-
plicable in an accurate fashion. Abstract propositions of law having
no relationship to the facts have often been discouraged by the
courts. 76 In those cases in which statutes or ordinances are pertinent
to the facts, many problems of accuracy have been found. In open
intersection cases with a technical right-of-way to the advantage of
one party or the other, it is absolutely necessary that an instruction in
the language of the Motor Vehicle Act be qualified. 7 Pedestrians in
76 Pearman v. Morris, 15 Ill. App.2d 486, 146 N.E.2d 589 (1957).
77 Leonard v. Murphy, 13 111. App.2d 39, 140 N.E.2d 537 (1957).
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crosswalks, however, are entitled to a bold verbatim statement of the
statute conferring their right-of-way, 7 and even if they are in the
middle of the block their rights cannot be diminished by an incomplete
quotation of the statute.79
While there are some early Illinois cases indicating that violation of
a statute or ordinance is negligence as a matter of law,8 ° the rule fol-
lowed in all of the recent decisions is that violations are only prima
facie evidence of negligence. 81 Yet, if a jury is told that a failure to
comply with an ordinance is "prima facie" negligence, that instruction
must fall because it "... is doubtful whether the ordinary juror would
understand the legal meaning of the term ... 2
Statutes or ordinances having a definite relationship to the facts
though copied properly from the books in which they are printed
must be hesitantly and cautiously employed. Their applicability is
just one test of whether the law flowing from them is accurately
stated. The variances in their use require not only a knowledge of the
law but a knowledge of when and how the law should be stated to
the jury. Accuracy in this respect, if our appellate decisions are to be
any guide, is not always enjoyed even by lawyers appearing regularly
in court.
Legislation is not the only field in which accuracy often is lacking
in the court's statement to the jury as supplied by the lawyers. The
intricate area of assumptions when contained in instructions often
leaves much to be desired in the way of accuracy and in many in-
stances should never be included. Although it is not error for the court
to assume in an instruction that which is established on one side and
not denied or contraverted on the other, it is imperative that any
material fact that is in issue not be assumed. Hence, it is reversible
error to assume negligence in a proximate cause instruction which
lends the right-of-way to a plaintiff when these very elements are in
issue.8 4 Any lawyer drafting an instruction which supposedly con-
78 Reese v. Buhle, 16 Ill. App.2d 13,147 N.E.2d 431 (1957).
79 Randal v. Deka, 10 111. App.2d 10, 134 N.E.2d 36 (1956); Parkin v. Rigdon, 1 111.
App.2d 586, 118 N.E.2d 342 (1954).
8 0 Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Parker, 131 I. 557, 23 N.E. 237 (1890); Terre Haute
& I. R. Co. v. Voelker, 129 Ill. 540, 22 N.E. 20 (1889).
81 Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 1.2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954).
82 Johnson v. Prendergast, 308 M. 255,264, 139N.E. 407, 410 (1923).
88 Clark v. Public Service Co., 278 Ill. App. 426 (1934).
84 Buglio v. Cummings, 317 111. App. 73, 45 N.E.2d 542 (1942).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
tains facts in evidence over which there is no dispute undertakes the
task at his peril and it is in this category in which reversal is most
often invited.
The entire province of jury instructions should be analyzed with
a view toward correcting those statements of law which are inaccurate
because not quite enough or just a little bit too much has been said.
A system of jury instructions that will assist practicing lawyers con-
taining accurate propositions of law and also presenting an analysis of
when, where, how and why a certain proposition should be given to
a jury can be an invaluable aid.
A SYSTEM NO' A COLLECTION
Accompanying each of the committee's instructions in final form
will be liberal citation of authorities. Reference will be made to per-
tinent statutes and decisions. These will be followed by a commentary
reproducing as fully as possible the reasons underlying the recom-
mendation of the instruction. Users of the instruction will have not
only the benefit of its origin in law but also the bases for the form in
which it has been drafted.
There are many well defined proper instructions which have no
place in a given lawsuit. The most striking example is the typical "un-
avoidable accident" instruction which is often tendered in personal
injury actions. The law is well settled in Illinois that this instruction
is erroneous where there is any evidence tending to prove that the
plaintiff's injury was coupled with negligence.8 5 It is in a very limited
area of factual situations in which an instruction of this type is proper.
The possibilities of prejudice and error are quite apparent in the de-
fining of "unavoidable accident." This is an example of an otherwise
good instruction being inapplicable in certain cases. There are many
others. To cover those situations in which it might be anticipated that
an instruction could be misused, caveats will be appended to instruc-
tions where necessary. There will be outlined any circumstance in
which the instruction is likely to be inapplicable and a warning that
its employment invites reversal. Perhaps of more importance is that
definitive statements will be supplied indicating instructions with
which that under consideration should be accompanied. The sug-
gested instruction can then be regarded as not only proper in content
but also in association. A cross reference system by number and title
85 Authority cited note 54, supra.
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will be the mechanical device included in the caveat that will seek to
insure accurate association of the respective suggested instructions.
Exhaustive research predated existing collections of instructions
which have long been employed in the trial courts of the state. The
supreme court's appointment of a committee to work upon a project
of improvements in our system of jury instructions should not be in-
terpreted as criticism or disparagement of either the men who have
collated instructions from existing case law or of the organizations
which have sponsored the publications. Case law, however, provides
more censure than commendation of instructions now in use. There
are decisions, of course, specifically approving properly worded in-
structions which invite continued use in the trial of lawsuits. That
which is being attempted, however, is not simply a recodification of
instructions previously acceptable to the courts. What the committee
hopes to attain is an all inclusive set of civil instructions which accu-
rately, clearly, simply and fairly state established principles of law un-
derstandable to the "twelve men good and true" and acceptable to
bench and bar.
The Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions has now
worked for over two years on this project. At its completion, the in-
structions will be submitted to the Supreme Court with the recom-
mendation that they be published in a bound volume imprinted with,
if not the imprimatur of the highest court of our state, at least, a recog-
nition that the results have been created under its auspices. The dignity
thus lent to the instructions can be the background for a truly effi-
cient Illinois system of instructing jurors.
It will be further recommended that the numbered instructions on
printed forms be placed in the various court clerks' offices making
them accessible to advocates and judges participating in civil litigation.
This is not the only feature that will be borrowed from California's
pioneering in the field of "pattern" instructions. Inherent in the
recommended system will be the building block method of fabricating
a complete charge to the jury. Many types of instructions lend them-
selves quite well to this device, i.e., a basic instruction concerning a
given subject which can be "built up" by additional sentences or para-
graphs as demanded by the evidence. The damage instruction in a civil
lawsuit is most typical. The elements of the nature and extent of the
injury, disability, permanency, pain and suffering, medical and hos-
pital expenses and loss of earnings are susceptible of proof in some
cases but one or more of the elements may be lacking in any given
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lawsuit. The elements to be considered by the jury depend upon the
status of the evidence. If there is no proof of one of the elements of
damages, then that factor should not be given to the jury, and the in-
struction can be appropriately reduced. Conversely, there are further
elements that may be added via the building block system.
The cross-indexing and the referral of one instruction to another in
the printed text can also be regarded as a building block method in
that one instruction or set of instructions can be and should be added
to others included in the system.
This system will not only make practice easier for the lawyer but
will also be helpful to the judge who may require prior to conclusion
of the case that he be supplied with those instructions which the lawyers
intend to tender. Being readily available to the court from the clerk,
there would be no trial time wasted, and the caveats and discussions
accompanying each instruction printed in the published volume would
supply the court with sufficient legal bases for refusing or giving an
instruction. It would further aid the judge in deciding what other
instructions, also available to him, should accompany those proffered
by counsel.
The publication of a book containing instructions, legal commen-
taries and suggested groupings of charges cannot in any way guaran-
tee error-free statements to the jury. Neither the supreme court nor
any appointees of it can prejudge or pre-approve any set of instruc-
tions. Endorsment of the publication by the highest court of our state
will not in any way prevent judicial review of instructions contained
in that volume. It will still be the responsibility of lawyers to prepare
proper statements of the law and the issues which are applicable to the
case. Excessive peremptories, inapplicable doctrines and repetitious-
ness are vices which no system can even mitigate without self-disci-
pline on the part of lawyers who have long been accustomed to pre-
paring partisan instructions with little or no respect for the real func-
tion of the court's charge. The value of such a system must, of course,
meet the severe requirements, tests and criticisms of those to whom it
will be made available. The problems suggested and discussed herein
are only some of the more obvious difficulties confronting lawyers and
judges of our state. If system can come to this facet of trial practice in
Illinois, alleviation of some of these problems and difficulties can
reasonably be anticipated. If that system is acceptable to lawyers, trial
courts and appellate tribunals, it should greatly aid in the administra-
tion of justice in jury trials in the State of Illinois.
